Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object by Hashimoto, Kazuhiko & Nakayama, Yu
Discussion Paper No. 961 
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS  
ON BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS 
WITH AN INDIVISIBLE OBJECT 
Kazuhiko Hashimoto 
Yu Nakayama 
February 2016 
The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems
with an Indivisible Object
Kazuhiko Hashimoto
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
and
Yu Nakayamay
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
February 27, 2016
Abstract
We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where
real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object
among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a
company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has
died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-
proofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include
at least three common preferences.
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1 Introduction
We analyze bankruptcy problems \with an indivisible object." \Normal"
bankruptcy problems consider how to allocate an amount of remaining money
among owners of a company that has gone bankrupt according to their claims,
such as portions of ownership. A rule is a function that associates monetary
allocation with claims. The claims are private information and owners might
try to manipulate a rule by reallocating their claims within a group in ad-
vance. Hence, one of the main purposes of analyses is to design a rule that
is immune to such manipulation. This non-manipulability condition is called
reallocation-proofness [Moulin (1985)].1
On the other hand, bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object con-
sider how to allocate an indivisible object2 such as a factory or a company
among owners3 with monetary compensation according to their preferences.
Their portions of ownership are public information. A rule is a function
that associates object assignment and monetary compensation with prefer-
ences. Their preferences are private information and owners might try to
manipulate a rule by misrepresenting their preferences. Hence, a primary
purpose of analysis is to design a rule that is immune to such manipula-
tion. This non-manipulability condition is called strategy-proofness [Gibbard
(1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)].4
In addition to strategy-proofness, we study rules satisfying a voluntary
participation condition called the ownership lower bound [Dubins and Spanier
(1961) and Cramton et al. (1987)]. Imagine a situation where an owner
whose portion of ownership is 30% evaluates the object to be worth $1; 000.
When the owner receives compensation less than $300 in spite of giving up
his ownership of the object, he does not admit this decision. Similarly, when
he receives the object but must pay more than $700, he does not admit this
decision. To make him admit the decision of the rule, the rule must make his
utility level at least $300. Formally, the ownership lower bound requires that
each owner's utility under the rule be at least as much as his value for the
object multiplied by his portion of ownership. When portions of ownership
are equal among owners, this condition is equivalent to the equal right lower
bound [Steinhaus (1948) and Moulin (1992)].
1See Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003, 2014) for surveys.
2We allow the object to be bad. Then, the problem is referred to as a \NIMBY
problem." See, for example, Sakai (2012) and Fujinaka (2008).
3We admit that there are not only owners whose portions of ownership are positive,
but also owners whose portions of ownership are zero. Strictly speaking, the former are
real owners, and the latter are outside traders.
4See Sprumont (1995) and Barbera (2001, 2012) for surveys.
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Bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object have other important
applications. For example, consider an \inheritance problem," as follows.
An indivisible object is a house left by a parent who has died. Owners might
be his wife and children.5 Their portions of ownership are determined by
law, in advance. They must decide who inherits the house with monetary
compensation. How should they do so? This is an issue that has caused
problems in family estates all over the world.
We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the
ownership lower bound.6 Furthermore, this impossibility result is valid on
any domains that include at least three common preferences.7 Thus, it is
important to consider other lower bounds or to expand the research scope
from deterministic rules to probabilistic rules.8
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 introduces the axioms. Section 4 states the results. Lastly, Section
5 provides proof.
2 Model
We consider an environment with a single indivisible object, hereafter called
object, and one divisible good called money. The object might be a company
that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so
on. Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the set of agents, where we assume n  2.
We denote agent i's portion of ownership for the object by i  0, which is
public information. Notice that we allow i = 0 for some i 2 N .9 We assume
that for at least two agents, their portions of ownership are positive. We call
(i)i2N such that
P
i2N i = 1, an ownership prole.
Each agent i 2 N has a preference over bundles consisting of object
assignment xi 2 f0; 1g and monetary assignment mi 2 R . We assume that
this preference is represented by a utility function ui(xi;mi) = vixi +mi for
5Of course, outside traders can also be participants.
6Moulin (2010) has shown that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and
the equal right lower bound on a continuous domain.
7Almost all studies on mechanism design assume preference domains that have cardi-
nality of the continuum. For example, see Holmstrom (1979), Zhou (1990), and Serizawa
(2002). However, a real economy may be nite. Hence, it is important to analyze problems
on nitely restricted preference domains. See also Ohseto (2000), Ando et al. (2008), and
Kato et al. (2015).
8See, for example, Porter et al. (2004) for a study on other lower bounds and Hashimoto
(2015) for a possibility result when we allow probabilistic rules.
9In other words, N can include not only real owners but also outside traders.
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some vi 2 Vi  R. Since a preference10 is identied by vi, we regard vi and
Vi as the preference and the set of preferences, respectively. We assume that
vi is private information of agent i 2 N . We call a list v  (vi)i2N 2 i2NVi
a preference prole.
The set of feasible allocations is
Z = f(xi;mi)i2N 2 (f0; 1g  R)n :
X
i2N
xi = 1 and
X
i2N
mi  0g:
A rule is a function f : i2NVi ! Z. Given a rule f and a preference prole
v 2 i2NVi, we denote by fi(v)  (xi(v);mi(v)) 2 f0; 1g  R, agent i's
assignment under f(v). For any v 2 i2NVi and N 0  N , let vN 0 2 i2N 0Vi
and v N 0 2 i2NnN 0Vi denote (vj)j2N 0 and (vj)j =2N 0 , respectively.
3 Axioms
We introduce the desirable properties. First, strategy-proofness states that
it is a dominant strategy for any agent to report his true preference.
Denition 1. A rule f satises strategy-proofness if for any v 2 i2NVi,
any i 2 N , and any v0i 2 Vi, it holds that
vixi(v) +mi(v)  vixi(v0i; v i) +mi(v0i; v i):
Next, the ownership lower bound states that each owner's utility under
the rule is at least as much as his value for the object multiplied by his
portion of ownership.
Denition 2. A rule f satises the ownership lower bound if for any
v 2 i2NVi and any i 2 N , it holds that
vixi(v) +mi(v)  ivi:
When for any i 2 N , i = 1n , the ownership lower bound is equivalent to
the equal right lower bound, dened below.
Denition 3. A rule f satises the equal right lower bound if for any
v 2 i2NVi and any i 2 N , it holds that
vixi(v) +mi(v)  1
n
vi:
10Notice that we also allow negative valuations.
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4 Results
We state the results. The rst result states that no rule satises the axioms on
domains where agents have three common preferences. The proof is provided
in next section.
Theorem 1. Given any ownership prole (i)i2N . Let V1; V2; : : : ; Vn be such
that V1 = V2 =    = Vn and #Vi = 3. Then, there exists no rule satisfying
strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound.
Since an impossibility result is also valid on larger domains, from this the-
orem, we immediately have the next result, which states that no rule satises
the axioms on domains that include at least three common preferences.
Corollary 1. Given any ownership prole (i)i2N . Let V1; V2; : : : ; Vn be such
that #(\i2NVi)  3. Then, there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness
and the ownership lower bound.
The following corollary is a generalization of Moulin (2010), who has
shown the impossibility on a continuous domain.
Corollary 2. Let V1; V2; : : : ; Vn be such that #(\i2NVi)  3. Then, there
exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the equal right lower bound.
Since the independence of the axioms in Theorem 1 is trivial, we omit
the details here.
5 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1. Let f be a rule satisfying strategy-proofness. For any v 2 i2NVi,
any i 2 N , and any v0i 2 Vi, it holds that
1. if xi(v) = 1 and vi < v
0
i, then fi(v) = fi(v
0
i; v i),
2. if xi(v) = 0 and vi > v
0
i, then fi(v) = fi(v
0
i; v i).
Proof of Lemma 1. We show the rst part. The second part is similar, so we
omit it here. Let v 2 i2NVi. Let i 2 N be such that xi(v) = 1. Let v0i 2 Vi
be such that vi < v
0
i. By strategy-proofness, it holds that(
vixi(v) +mi(v)  vixi(v0i; v i) +mi(v0i; v i)
v0ixi(v
0
i; v i) +mi(v
0
i; v i)  v0ixi(v) +mi(v);
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that is, (
vi(1  xi(v0i; v i))  mi(v0i; v i) mi(v)
mi(v
0
i; v i) mi(v)  v0i(1  xi(v0i; v i));
which implies that
vi(1  xi(v0i; v i))  v0i(1  xi(v0i; v i));
that is,
(vi   v0i)(1  xi(v0i; v i))  0:
Since vi < v
0
i, it must be that
xi(v
0
i; v i) = 1:
Hence, we have xi(v) = xi(v
0
i; v i). Then, by strategy-proofness, we also
obtain that mi(v) = mi(v
0
i; v i). Therefore, we have fi(v) = fi(v
0
i; v i):
Lemma 2. Let f be a rule satisfying the ownership lower bound. Let v 2
i2NVi. Let i 2 N be such that vi = minfv1; v2; : : : ; vng. If there exists j 2 N
such that j > 0 and vj > vi, then we have xi(v) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let j 2 N be such that j > 0 and vj > vi. Suppose, to
the contrary, that xi(v) = 1. By the ownership lower bound, we obtain that
mi(v)  ivi   vi =  (1  i)vi
and
mj(v)  jvj > jvi;
and also that, for any k 6= i; j,
mk(v)  kvk  kvi:
By summing these inequalities, we haveX
h2N
mh(v) >  (1  i)vi +
X
h6=i
hvi = 0:
This contradicts the feasibility. Therefore, we have xi(v) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a rule f on
i2NVi satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound. Denote
Vi = fa; b; cg, where a < b < c. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that x1(a; a; : : : ; a) = 1.
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Claim 1. f1(a; a; : : : ; a) = (1; (1 1)a), and for any i 6= 1, fi(a; a; : : : ; a) =
(0; ia).
Proof of Claim 1. By the ownership lower bound, we obtain that
m1(a; a; : : : ; a)   (1  1)a;
and that, for any i 6= 1,
mi(a; a; : : : ; a)  ia:
Then, by the feasibility, these imply that
m1(a; a; : : : ; a) =  (1  1)a;
and that, for any i 6= 1,
mi(a; a; : : : ; a) = ia;
which are the desired results.
Claim 2. f1(b; a; : : : ; a) = (1; (1 1)a), and for any i 6= 1, fi(b; a; : : : ; a) =
(0; ia).
Proof of Claim 2. Since b > a, by Claim 1 and Lemma 1, we have
f1(b; a; : : : ; a) = f1(a; a; : : : ; a) = (1; (1  1)a):
Then, by the ownership lower bound, for any i 6= 1, it follows that
mi(b; a; : : : ; a)  ia;
which means, by the feasibility, that
mi(b; a; : : : ; a) = ia:
These are the desired results.
In the following, without loss of generality, we assume that 2 > 0.
Claim 3. x2(b; b; a; : : : ; a) = 1 and m2(b; b; a; : : : ; a)   (1  2)b:
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Proof of Claim 3. Suppose, to the contrary, that x2(b; b; a; : : : ; a) = 0. Since,
by Claim 2, f2(b; a; a; : : : ; a) = (0; 2a), it holds, by strategy-proofness, that
m2(b; b; a; : : : ; a) = m2(b; a; a; : : : ; a) = 2a:
However, the ownership lower bound requires that
m2(b; b; a; : : : ; a)  2b > 2a;
which is a contradiction. Thus, we obtain that
x2(b; b; a; : : : ; a) = 1:
Then, by the ownership lower bound, we have
m2(b; b; a; : : : ; a)   (1  2)b:
Claim 4. x2(b; c; a; : : : ; a) = 1 and m2(b; c; a; : : : ; a)   (1  2)b.
Proof of Claim 4. Since c > b, by Claim 3 and Lemma 1, it follows that
x2(b; c; a; : : : ; a) = x2(b; b; a; : : : ; a) = 1
and
m2(b; c; a; : : : ; a) = m2(b; b; a; : : : ; a)   (1  2)b;
which are the desired results.
Claim 5. m1(b; c; a; : : : ; a)  1c.
Proof of Claim 5. By the same argument as Claim 3, we obtain that
x2(c; c; a; : : : ; a) = 1;
that is,
x1(c; c; a; : : : ; a) = 0:
Then, by the ownership lower bound, we have
m1(c; c; a; : : : ; a)  1c:
Since b < c, by Lemma 1, it holds that
m1(b; c; a; : : : ; a) = m1(c; c; a; : : : ; a)  1c;
which is the desired result.
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Claim 6. For any agent i 6= 1; 2, mi(b; c; a; : : : ; a)  ib:
Proof of Claim 6. Dene V   i2NVi as follows:
V   fv 2 i2NVi : v1 = b; v2 = c; and v3; : : : ; vn 2 fa; bgg:
For any ` = 0; : : : ; n  2, dene V (`)  V  as follows:
V (`)  fv 2 V  : #fi 2 N : vi = ag = `g:
We show this claim by the following induction.
1. For any v 2 V (0), it holds that x2(v) = 1, and that for any i 6= 1; 2,
mi(v)  ib.
2. If for any `0 < ` and any v 2 V (`0), it holds that x2(v) = 1, and that
for any i 6= 1; 2, mi(v)  ib, then for any v 2 V (`), it holds that
x2(v) = 1, and that for any i 6= 1; 2, mi(v)  ib.
The rst part.
Note that V (0) = f(b; c; b; : : : ; b)g. Then, by Lemma 2, for any i 6= 2, it holds
that
xi(b; c; b; : : : ; b) = 0;
which means that
x2(b; c; b; : : : ; b) = 1:
Then, by the ownership lower bound, for any i 6= 2, we also have
mi(b; c; b; : : : ; b)  ib:
These are the desired results.
The second part.
Let v 2 V (`). Without loss of generality, we may assume that
v = (b; c; a; : : : ; a| {z }
` agents
; b; : : : ; b| {z }
n 2 ` agents
):
By Lemma 2, for any i = 3; : : : ; `+ 2, it follows that
xi(v) = 0;
which means, by the induction hypothesis and strategy-proofness, that
mi(v) = mi(v
0
i; v i)  ib; (1)
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where v0i = b. Furthermore, by the ownership lower bound, it follows that
m1(v)  1b  bx1(v)
and
m2(v)  2c  cx2(v);
and that for any j = `+ 3; : : : ; n,
mj(v)  jb  bxj(v): (2)
We show that x2(v) = 1. Suppose, to the contrary that, x2(v) = 0. Since, for
any i = 3; : : : ; `+ 2, xi(v) = 0, it means that for some h 2 f1; `+ 3; : : : ; ng,
xh(v) = 1. Then, by summing the above inequalities, we have
X
k2N
mk(v) 
X
k 6=2
kb+ 2c  bx1(v)  cx2(v)  b
nX
j=`+3
xj(v)
=
X
k 6=2
kb+ 2c  b
=  2b+ 2c
> 0;
which contradicts the feasibility. Thus, it holds that x2(v) = 1. Then, by
inequalities (1) and (2), we also have that for any i 6= 1; 2, mi(v)  ib.
Therefore, this claim is valid.
Claim 7. 1 = 0, and for any i 6= 1; 2, xi(b; c; a; : : : ; a) = 0 andmi(b; c; a; : : : ; a) =
ib:
Proof. By Claim 4, for any i 6= 1; 2, we have
xi(b; c; a; : : : ; a) = 0:
By Claim 4, we also have
m2(b; c; a; : : : ; a)   (1  2)b:
By Claim 5, we have
m1(b; c; a; : : : ; a)  1c:
By Claim 6, for any i 6= 1; 2, we have
mi(b; c; a; : : : ; a)  ib: (3)
10
By summing these inequalities, we obtain thatX
i2N
mi(b; c; a; : : : ; a)   1b+ 1c = 1(c  b):
If 1 > 0, then the right-hand side of the above inequality is positive, which
contradicts the feasibility. Hence, we must have 1 = 0. If inequality (3) is
valid with a strict sign of inequality for some i 6= 1; 2, then this also means
a contradiction to the feasibility. Thus, we have the desired results.
Since, by Claim 7, 1 = 0, in the following, without loss of generality, we
also assume that 3 > 0.
Claim 8. For any i 6= 1; 3, xi(b; a; c; a; : : : ; a) = 0 and mi(b; a; c; a; : : : ; a) =
ib:
Proof. By replacing the roles of agent 2 and agent 3 in Claims 3 to 7, sym-
metric arguments imply the desired results.
Claim 9. We derive a contradiction.
Proof. Since the object is indivisible, it obviously follows that
x2(b; c; c; a : : : ; a) = 0 or x3(b; c; c; a : : : ; a) = 0:
Without loss of generality, we assume that
x3(b; c; c; a : : : ; a) = 0:
Then, by Claim 7 and strategy-proofness, it holds that
m3(b; c; c; a : : : ; a) = m3(b; c; a; a : : : ; a) = 3b:
However, since the ownership lower bound requires that
m3(b; c; c; a : : : ; a)  3c > 3b;
we have a contradiction.11
Therefore, Theorem 1 is valid.
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